UK Home Office's recent attack on e2e encryption moves into the realm of baseless propaganda, diverging significantly from much of the rest of UK gov & from established expert consensus, complete w media salvo
Let's review, it's important to recognize what they're doing...1/
After starting w emotionally upsetting statistics about child abuse, which work to activate our frontal cortex and evoke distress, they then characterize e2ee as tech that "overrides current controls in place that help to keep children safe." 2/
Subsequently, they engage in a specious rhetorical move common to this latest anti-encryption wave: they conflate social media broadcast platforms with messaging services, and imply that e2ee messaging will stop efforts to mitigate the sharing/broadcast of CSAM. This is false. 3/
Here, it's important to recognize that no evidence connects such referrals to increased *prosecutions*. Data for England and Wales shows prosecutions ~constant since 2014, even as referrals increase. This implies more data is not always more helpful for children in real life. 4/
Finally, they lie, claiming client side scanning prototypes whose dev they funded prove, by existing, that such tech works
Not only has the UK gov acknowledged CSS cannot safely scan e2ee, but the expert review the gov commissioned found THESE SAME PROTOTYPES were unsafe! 5/
@Mer__edith #ukgov claims it's"feasible" so the comments in the Lords apply, @signalapp will be asked to break security...
