How many missiles and "Shaheds" has Russia accumulated for air attacks on Ukrainian cities in the fall and winter?

September 2023 was a record-breaking month for the number of Shahed-type kamikaze strike drones launched on the territory of Ukraine.

According to analysts at the Defence Express portal, Russia launched 503 drones on Ukraine last month. This is significantly more than the previous highest rate, which was observed in May of this year when about 400 drones were launched.

This month’s statistics are lower. But it is more telling that in October, the number of cruise missiles launched by Russia toward Ukrainian cities decreased significantly.

There is an explanation for this situation — Moscow is accumulating missiles for future attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure in the fall and winter.

Interlocutors of Ukrainska Pravda in the Ukrainian Air Force and the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine believe that Moscow can produce approximately 100–120 long-range missiles of various types every month.

According to open-source information, more than 100 missiles were launched on Ukraine in September and about 40 in October. That means that Russia has only switched to the "economy mode" that experts say it has been using in the last month. So far, the rate of missile use is not significantly different from the spring-summer one.

Taking into account the probable monthly production, it can be assumed that Russia currently has approximately 700 long-range missiles.

Although the enemy has indeed decreased its use of long-range missiles from strategic aviation or the sea, the vast majority of attacks are now being carried out on grain and port infrastructure in the southern regions.

They use a combined approach when anti-ship and medium-range air defense missiles (Kh-56 та Kh-35, and Oniks) are used along with drone strikes from a relatively short distance, which are not included in the statistics provided by the intelligence. One of the problems with calculations for these missiles is that there is not much open data on them, and their real stockpiles in Russia are uncertain.

Evidently, Ukraine and its partners have drawn certain conclusions from last year's autumn and winter. There is a strong desire to believe that preparedness for another energy terror has been brought to a high level.

But it is equally apparent that Russia has learned from its past mistakes, significantly diversifying its tactics and combinations of potential strikes from the sky. So we can't expect this winter to be any easier than the last one.